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ABSTRACT
Pakistan tax system reforms carried out during 2001–2010, were overwhelming, 
expensive, and a failure. The reforms were financially afforded and technically 
assisted by World Bank. While both Government of Pakistan and World Bank 
agreed on the failure of tax reforms, each blamed the other for the failure. 
A consensus, however, does exist as regards the fact that the reform program 
left the tax system more gridlocked, retrofitted, and incapacitated than before 
to generate both sufficient and healthy revenues. The paper adopts case study 
approach to explore into the factors of failure of the reform program. The study 
is anchored in Large Taxpayers’ Unit, Islamabad — a flagship taxing field 
formation established under the reform project. The data are produced from 
Large Taxpayers’ Unit, Islamabad, to assess its jurisdictional, functional, and 
operational capacity and explain why its tax collection curve flattens after 2012. 
The insights so derived at micro-level are made to feed back into macro-canvass 
of the program and enhance our holistic understanding and see its failure in 
a different and closer-to-reality light. The analysis is extrapolated to the national 
level to argue that as soon as political ownership and donor oversight — the 
key drivers — were omitted from the equation, the resultant resource constrains 
were enough to frustrate and fail the entire reform program. The conclusions 
drawn are generalizable to most similarly-circumstanced developing countries 
and their rigidly underperforming tax systems.
KEYWORDS
Pakistan tax system; tax reforms; Large Taxpayers’ Unit; World Bank reforms; 
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JEL H1 
HIGHLIGHTS
1. The evaluation of a tax reform program being essentially subjective could well 
be undertaken by adopting case study approach that generates empirics at micro-
level, which get fed into the analytics at the macro-level
2. In order for the tax reform evaluation to stay comprehensively meaningful, it covers 
the micro locale being evaluated across its full spectrum i.e. jurisdictional, functional, 
and operational capacity
3. Continued political ownership and donor oversight are key variables of a tax 
reform program, and their elimination from the equation mid-stream potentially 
results in reversing and even perverting the entire reform agenda
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Реформы налоговой системы Пакистана, проведенные в 2001–2010 гг., были 
масштабными, дорогостоящими и неудачными. Реформы финансово и ор-
ганизационно поддерживались Всемирным банком. Правительство Паки-
стана и Всемирный банк одинаково оценивают результат налоговых реформ 
как провал, но ответственность за него каждый возлагает на противополож-
ную сторону. По общему мнению, проведенные реформы привели налого-
вую систему Пакистана в тупик, сделав ее более модернизированной, но не-
дееспособной для достаточной и разумной мобилизации государственных 
доходов. В статье на основе анализа конкретных случаев, рассматриваются 
причины провала реформ. Исследование основано на анализе фактических 
данных о деятельности подразделения, работающего с крупными налого-
плательщиками Исламабада, созданного в рамках налоговой реформы и яв-
ляющегося лидером в работе с крупными налогоплательщиками Пакистана. 
Результаты исследования позволяют оценить юрисдикционный, функци-
ональный и оперативный потенциал данного подразделения и объяснить, 
почему налоговые доходы остановились на уровне 2012 г. Выводы, получен-
ные на микроуровне, позволяют понять ситуацию в целом и реально оце-
нить последствия налоговых реформ. Анализ экстраполирован на нацио-
нальный уровень, что позволило утверждать, что, как только политическая 
заинтересованность и контроль со стороны доноров — ключевые движущие 
силы программы реформ — были исключены из процесса, ограниченности 
внутренних ресурсов оказалось достаточно, чтобы сорвать и провалить всю 
программу налоговых реформ. Полученные результаты характерны для 
большинства развивающихся стран, со схожей экономической ситуацией 
и отсталыми налоговыми системами.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налоговая система Пакистана; налоговые реформы; подразделение по работе 
с крупными налогоплательщиками; реформы Всемирного банка; Федераль-
ный совет по доходам, налоговая служба
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. Изучение конкретных случаев на микроуровне и их анализ на макроуровне 
позволяют проверить кажущиеся ошибочными субъективные оценки реализа-
ции программы налоговых реформ
2. Комплексная оценка налоговой реформы на микроуровене должна содер-
жать данные о юрисдикционном, функциональном и оперативном аспектах 
потенциала налоговых служб
3. Политическая заинтересованность властей и контроль со стороны доноров 
являются ключевыми движущими силами налоговых реформ, их устранение 
из процесса может привести к прекращению или извращению всей програм-
мы реформ
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Introduction
Pakistan tax system went through 
major reforms during the first decade 
of the present century. The tax reforms 
were charted out by the Task Force on 
Reform of Tax Administration, which 
was appointed by the government of 
Pakistan in June, 2000. The Task Force 
was headed by Syed Shahid Hussain, an 
economist by profession with extensive 
exposure at the international level1. The 
World Bank chipped in with a grant sum 
of US $500,000 for the preparation of the 
Task Force report2, which was presented 
in May, 2001. The Government of Paki-
stan approved the Task Force report im-
mediately with the directions to devise 
an implementation strategy in respect of 
the viable prescriptions. The report was 
shared and discussed with cross-sections 
of the society as well as Pakistan’s do-
nors with a view to seeking their inputs 
on various reform measures prescribed. 
On Government of Pakistan’s request for 
input on Federal Board of Revenue’s tax 
reform program, an International Mon-
etary Fund Mission also visited Pakistan 
in August, 2001 [1]. The Task Force had 
been set extensive terms of reference3, 
1 The TFRTA also included Dr. Wasim Azhar, 
Dr. Altamash Kamal, Khawar Anwar Khawaja, 
Ahsan M. Saleem, Naeem Akhtar Sheikh, Badar 
F. Vellani, Syed Shabbar Zaidi, and Syed Riaz 
Hussain Naqvi as its members; and Ahmad Khan 
as both a member and secretary.
2 Ahmad Khan. Personal Interview — 
February 5. Islamabad, 2014
3 The TFRTA was tasked to review the: (i) 
existing management and policies of CBR and 
its subordinate organizations to evaluate their ef-
fectiveness; (ii) management of human resources, 
i.e. recruitment, training, promotion, evaluation 
of performance and discipline; (iii) the compensa-
tion system for its effectiveness in attracting and 
motivating qualified persons and ensuring in-
tegrity; (iv) the causes of corruption among staff 
and management of the tax administration and 
recommend measures to eliminate corruption; 
(v) system and processes, for the management of 
information as a key ingredient in improving the 
effectiveness of the tax machinery; (vi) the organi-
zation and structure of the tax administration in 
relation to the needs of cost minimization, speedy 
processing and decision-making, engendering a 
sense of service and responsibility; & (vii) legal 
and administrative status of CBR and its subordi-
nate organizations.
but it claimed to have majorly “focused 
on human resources, business process 
and organization, corruption and infor-
mation technology”4. At the implemen-
tation stage, the reform program, both 
financially and technically, was assisted 
by the World Bank through the Tax Ad-
ministration Reform Project (TARP)5, 
which carried a total budgeted allocation 
of US$ 149 million — disbursed between 
2004 and 2011. 
The reform program looked to per-
colate with the tax system in most areas, 
including but not limited to, the injection 
of information technology into the pro-
cesses; workforce recruitment, training 
and remuneration; promulgation of new 
tax laws and rules; induction of profes-
sional members at the Federal Board of 
Revenue; large-scale procurement of 
work logistics; computing hard- and 
soft-wares; acquisition of short-term con-
sultancy services in thematic deficiency 
areas; autonomization; and shifting of 
focus from hard revenue numbers to an-
cillary soft areas like grievance-redressal, 
speedy refund process, and taxpayers’ fa-
cilitation etc. On business reengineering, 
the reforms helped roll back the entire 
network of field formations numbering 
757 Circles, 139 Ranges, 32 Commission-
erates (Zones), and 5 Regions6, vertically 
integrated [2], and spatially squeeze it 
into only 15 major cities in the name of 
functionalization7. 
In fact, tax reforms have a long history 
in Pakistan and a large body of literature 
has been created on the subject by vari-
ous tax reform commissions appointed 
4 GOP, The Task Force on Reform of Tax 
Administration Report. Islmabad: Ministry of 
Finance, 2001. (ii).
5 The TARP was approved (and launched) 
on December 7, 2004, and closed on Decem- 
ber 11, 2011.
6 The «Circle» being the basic unit of assess-
ment was headed by Deputy Commissioner, 
«Range» by Additional Commissioner, «Zone» 
by Commissioner, and «Region» by Regional 
Commissioner — the highest IRS officer in the 
field — with all being vertically integrated into 
a pyramid.
7 See, for a full range of tax reform initia-
tives, GOP.
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over the past 70 years8. It has been ar-
gued that not only that all of the reform 
initiatives failed but also that they left the 
system more gridlocked and retrofitted 
than before on their completion [3], with 
TARP-driven reforms not proving to be 
any different. In fact, TARP were rated a 
failure, inter alia, since “no focus could be 
given to building departmental capacity 
to give quantum jump to revenue collec-
tion; rent-seeking remained rife, morale 
of the Service dropped down to abysmal 
levels, and tax delinquents had a hay-day” 
[3, p. 403]. Interestingly, while both the 
Government of Pakistan and the World 
Bank agreed that the reform program had 
failed to achieve its avowed objectives, at 
least, up to a desired level, they counter-
blamed each other for the failure. Measur-
ing “World Bank’s performance as highly 
unsatisfactory” Federal Board of Revenue 
took the position that the reforms “failed 
to produce desired results due to weak su-
pervision of the World Bank” , which was 
“strong at the beginning of the project but 
overtime became weaker” , and because of 
the fact that “requests for clearances took 
longer, leading to many procurement de-
lays” [4]. 
The World Bank, on the other hand, 
reckoned Federal Board of Revenue’s 
performance as “unsatisfactory,” arguing 
that the “quality at entry was affected by 
major shortcomings, such as insufficient 
8 See, for instance, The Sales Tax Committee 
Report (1950); The Taxation Enquiry Committee 
Report (Vol. 1–2) (1960); The Sales Tax Commit-
tee Report (1960); The Commission on Taxation 
and Tariff (First Report) (1965); The Commission 
on Taxation and Tariff (Second Report) (1966); 
The Commission on Taxation and Tariff (Third 
Report) (1967); The Commission on Taxation 
and Tariff (Fourth Report) (1967); The Commis-
sion on Taxation and Tariff (Fifth Report) (1967); 
The Taxation Commission Report (Vol. 1–2) 
(1974); The National Taxation Reform Commis-
sion Report (Part 1–3) (1986); The Committee 
on Tax Reforms Report (1991); Study of Direct 
Taxation (1989); The Resource Mobilization and 
Tax Reforms Commission Report (1994); The 
Task Force on Fiscal Reforms Report (1996); The 
Commission on Tax Reforms Report (1998); The 
Committee to Revise Income Tax (Policy and) 
Law Report, 2001 (2001); The Task Force on Re-
form of Tax Administration Report; Tax Reform 
Commission Report (2016).
identification of critical risk factors and 
mitigation measures, inadequate tech-
nical support on key reform areas, and 
misclassification of environmental cat-
egory”, and “criticized the government of 
Pakistan for inconsistent commitment to 
tax administration reform agenda, which 
affected project’s implementation” [4]. At 
the closure of the reform program, it was 
remarked that “simple average of the ‘tax 
to gross domestic product (GDP)’ ratio in 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, 
countries with similar tax policies and ad-
ministration, is systematically higher than 
in Pakistan, and (that) the gap increased 
during this decade” [5, p. 549]. Additional 
evidence to the fact that the tax reforms 
failed miserably comes from the fact that 
yet another tax reform commission was 
established as soon as Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz government took office 
in 2013 — and well before curtains had 
fallen on many of TARP-propelled reform 
initiatives9. 
Against the backdrop of an across-
the-board generalized battering of the 
TARP-driven tax reform program’s hope-
less failure, this paper is an attempt to ex-
plore into the specifics of how did the re-
forms actually come by, and then how did 
they fail? The required empirics are gener-
ated by reducing the focus from the over-
all tax reforms to just one strand, namely, 
establishment of Large Taxpayers’ Units 
(LTUs), and then by developing a case 
study in respect of LTU-Islamabad. The 
paper consists of seven sections — exclud-
ing introduction and conclusion. After 
a brief literature review in section 1, sec-
tion 2 sets the national tax reform in con-
text by covering its various dimensions. 
Section 3 seminally treats the process of 
establishment of LTUs as LTU-ization in 
Pakistan’s context by accentuating its pre-
ponderant weightage within the overall 
reform package, and its percolation im-
pact on the state’s revenue function. The 
next three sections i.e. section 4, 5, and 6, 
deal with jurisdictional, functional and 
9 The Tax Reform Commission was es-
tablished vide FBR’s Notification No. 6(5)Co-
ord/2014, dated September 25, 2014, captioned 
as «Constitution of Tax Reforms Commission».
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operational capacities of LTU-Islamabad 
as an institution — drawing out critical 
deficiencies, which negatively tell on the 
revenue operations. The Conclusion sums 
up the debate by drawing insights from 
the case study and feeding them back into 
the overall tax reforms so as to infer that 
the reforms failed because of the drying 
up of three key input ingredients i.e. gov-
ernmental ownership, donor oversight 
and adequate resource supply to sustain 
the reforms in post-donor withdrawal 
phase. The summations so derived could 
then be generalized to other developing 
countries with struggling tax systems.
1. Literature review
The term “tax reforms” as used in lit-
erature, refers to the process of changing 
the way government manages taxes and 
administers its tax machinery. The objec-
tives of tax reforms may vary in differing 
spatial and temporal zones. But in a giv-
en situation, a typical tax reform may be 
driven by any or any subset of a broad set 
of tax reform objectives, including but not 
limited to reducing the level of taxation 
on all or some persons; rendering the tax 
system more or less progressive; simplify-
ing the tax system to increase compliance; 
making the tax administration more trans-
parent, corruption-free, and accountable; 
and bringing efficiency to the tax system 
so as to enable it to decrease externalities 
and increase production. Thus, the de-
sign of any tax reform would predomi-
nantly depend upon what it is intended to 
achieve, but in reality, there could be ap-
parent and not-so-apparent objectives of a 
given tax reform process.
Grossman and Helpman argue that 
the process of state-formation is strongly 
associated with its capacity to tax as politi-
cal organizations play a key role towards 
developing a tax-culture in a society. They 
identify political economy strains, colo-
nial overhang, and administrative con-
strictions in fiscally struggling economies 
as impacting their extractive effort [6]. 
Bird argues that any meaningful initia-
tive launched to reform a tax system must 
look to address the problems like under-
staffing, inadequate skill-set, logistical 
shortages, complexity in tax codes, lack 
of punitive and prosecutive action, inap-
propriate 3rd party information collection 
and collation, and risk-profiling that are 
generally associated with fiscally strug-
gling economies [7]. Gordon and Li hold 
corruption and red-tape as responsible 
factors for the poor performance of tax 
systems in developing countries, which 
need to be arrested, if the extractive effort 
is to be enhanced [8].
After comprehensively appraising 
various theories of taxation, Ahmad and 
Stern go onto prescribed a general theory 
of reforms, which makes use of the concept 
of welfare loss associated with an increase 
in ith tax sufficient to raise Rs. 1 in revenue, 
and discounts a differentiation of the struc-
ture given distributional, incentive and 
revenue concerns by a judicious balancing 
of tax instruments such as a single or dual 
rate value added tax (VAT) together with 
systems of excises [9]. Ahmed and Stern’s 
theory of tax reforms further prescribes 
that it can, at times, be misleading to look 
at one set of tax tools in isolation of what is 
happening elsewhere in the tax system10; 
that, the focus of indirect taxation should 
be final consumption implying that inter-
mediate goods should not be taxed unless 
there is difficulty in taxing final goods11; 
that given a natural trade-off between ef-
ficiency and equity with well-functioning 
schemes for income support generally 
absenting, there is no prescription for uni-
formity of the indirect system and that, 
in principle, the economic rationale, for 
corporate income tax, as distinct from per-
sonal income tax, lies in taxing foreign in-
comes and monopoly rents [9].
10 For instance, redistribution should not be 
allocated to income taxes and revenue rasining to 
indirect taxes. Both taxes affect distribution and 
resources allocation and raise revenue. In partic-
ular, the desirability of the differetiation in com-
modity taxes on distributional grounds is closely 
related to other policies towards distribution. The 
stronger the other tools, the smaller the redistrib-
utive role for commodity taxes.
11 It must be recognized taht the elimination 
of tariffs except for protection is a long term goal 
which for revenue reasons cannot be achieved in 
the short or medium term in countries with very 
few tax handles.
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This is quite apparent that there are no 
monolithic models of an “ideal” tax sys-
tem and societies try to approach and con-
ceive their “ideal” tax system as per their 
own needs and aspirations. The character-
istics of an “ideal” tax system for a devel-
oping country, as generally prescribed by 
Bretton Woods institutional framework, 
include: (a) heavy reliance on a broadly-
based sales tax e.g. VAT, preferably with 
a single rate and least exemptions, and 
excise taxes on petroleum products, al-
cohol, tobacco and perhaps a few luxury 
items; (b) zero reliance on export duties, 
except possibly as a proxy for income tax 
for hard-to-tax sectors such as agriculture; 
(c) reliance on import duties for protec-
tive purposes only — since the domestic 
sales tax is assigned the revenue-raising 
function — with a low average rate and 
a limited dispersion of rates to minimize 
effective rates of protection; (d) an admin-
istratively simple form of personal income 
tax, with exemptions limited, if possible, 
to personal dependents’ allowances, a 
moderate top marginal rate, an exemp-
tion limit large enough to exclude persons 
with modest incomes, and a substantial re-
liance on withholding; and (e) a corporate 
income tax levied at only one moderate-
to-low rate, with depreciation and other 
non-cash expenditure provisions uniform 
across sectors and minimal recourse to in-
centive schemes for new ventures [10].
The prescription traces its origins in 
the neo-economic liberalism as enshrined 
in the so-called Washington Consensus 
[11]. Over the past couple of decades, inter-
national financial institutions (IFIs) across 
the globe, have been advising their client 
countries to extricate themselves from 
the welfare function, try to balance their 
budgets, and fall back upon international 
frameworks only for balance of payments 
purposes. Accordingly, fundamental fo-
cus on role of taxation appears to have 
shifted of late, when both academicians 
and IFIs started to assign much narrower 
a role to the tax system that it “should fo-
cus on raising revenues” [12, p. 1]. It has 
also been exhorted, “that taxation creates 
distortions and the main object of tax poli-
cy is to design a system that raises enough 
revenue to meet a Government’s revenue 
target while minimizing the level of as-
sociated distortions” [13]. It follows that 
the main purpose of taxation is to raise 
resources to finance government expen-
diture, and therefore, a tax system ought 
to be designed and reformed in a man-
ner which is administratively and politi-
cally feasible and which promotes equity 
and efficiency as far as possible. The IFIs-
sponsored prescriptions targeted at rais-
ing revenues — that too VAT-propelled 
revenues — have been widely challenged 
at the intellectual plain, but the countries 
facing BOP constrains had no alternative 
but to walk into implementing the rec-
ommended design of the tax system, and 
Pakistan has been no exception.
To Robina and Mark, revenue effort 
in Pakistan’s particular case is seriously 
hampered by shortage of human resource, 
inadequate skill-set, logistical insufficien-
cy, legal complexities, lax enforcement of 
penal and prosecutive regimes, ineffectual 
identification system of taxpayers, below 
par tax collection by sub-national govern-
ments, and that a comprehensive reform 
program must look to address both policy 
and administrative side inadequacies [14]. 
Pasha believes what a country can achieve 
by launching a process of tax reforms is 
squarely determined by its overall gov-
ernance capacity. He contextually defines 
‘governance’ as “the capacity of the state 
to organize the tax system according to 
some basic and universal principles, and 
to enforce compliance with rules… (and) 
implies a minimum degree of autonomy 
from pressure of special interests in the 
formulation of policy” [15]. In turn, po-
litical will and ability of the ruling elites 
to articulate the need for reform within an 
integrated economic and social vision, co-
hesion and co-ordination among govern-
ment agencies, success in putting together 
support coalitions and mechanisms for 
compensation of losers (if necessary), and 
presence of capable bureaucratic cadres 
committed to the proposed reforms, are 
the vital ingredients of a given state’s gov-
ernance capacity [15]. Islam holds that a 
structured framework for working out the 
benefits of corporate tax reform is not yet 
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available and, at present, guiding princi-
ples should be simplicity, practicality and 
neutrality [16, p. 7]. Thirsk undertakes a 
comprehensive analysis of all major taxes 
i.e. income tax, sales tax, federal excise, 
wealth tax, and customs revenue from im-
ports, and the way those are levied on in-
dividuals, association of persons (AOPs), 
corporates, and proposes measures for 
improvement in all areas [17].
Wahid and Wallace focus on the dis-
tribution and effective tax rate of all cur-
rent major taxes in Pakistan to provide a 
detailed analysis of the incidence of the 
tax burden by type of tax, and suggest op-
tions for tax reform to rectify distortions 
[18]. Michielse looks at the international 
dimension of Pakistan tax system in detail, 
identifies areas needing improvement and 
recommends policy interventions [19]. 
2. Research context
The paper argues that, in overall 
terms, TARP-led tax reforms reflected a 
fortuitous coincidence of wants on part 
of Government of Pakistan and World 
Bank. The Musharraf regime, in the post-
9/11 period, had seamlessly aligned itself 
with US in the global war on terror. This 
politically correct alignment in the tem-
poral context not only helped trigger the 
economy, but also propelled the bilateral 
and multilateral donors to scramble to 
Pakistan and handhold it in many key 
development and governance areas. The 
mutual urge both on part of Pakistan and 
World Bank was a key factor of the tax re-
form program, which, in turn, was nested 
in the international system. At the turn of 
the decade, however, Pakistan saw its rel-
evance and role in war on terror nosedive. 
This, coupled with Musharraf regime’s 
end and the dawn of a new democratic 
dispensation in Pakistan resulted in al-
most complete dissipation of ownership 
of the tax reforms program which was 
still in a phase of implementational in-
fancy. Periodic monitoring of the reform 
program by the World Bank also seized in 
December 2011 when TARP was formally 
closed down. 
This way the change of government 
in Islamabad and closure of TARP took 
out two key dynamics and drivers of the 
reform program, that is, political owner-
ship and donor oversight. This not only 
meant virtual abandonment of the tax 
reforms mid-stream, but also a sudden 
squeeze on resource allocation that were, 
in fact, needed to continue implemen-
tation of various reform measures. The 
bureaucratic leadership having a sense 
of fiscal imperatives also vanished with 
the change of political leadership giving 
the tax reform initiative a critical blow. It 
goes without saying that tax reforms have 
always been hard to conceive, harder to 
implement, and hardest to sustain. Once 
implemented, tax reforms require on-go-
ing supply of political will, administrative 
leadership, and investment of resources 
both in terms of men and means to sustain 
them over rather a longish period of time 
to have them seeped into and become part 
of the main system. This did not occur in 
Pakistan’s context.
At the beginning of 2010, a slacken-
ing economy, sky-rocketing oil prices in 
the international market, launch of the op-
eration Zerb-e-Azab in Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas to root out terrorism, 
and below par revenue effort, resulted 
in an exploding fiscal deficit, which, in 
turn, led to an increased demand on the 
tax administration for ever more revenues 
pushing it into a brute number-chasing 
machine. This is how the TARP-driven tax 
reform program was never implemented 
full-length with some of the measures that 
had been completed getting rolled back; 
others never getting close to the finish line; 
and still others still being in an embryon-
ic stage when the orphanage struck it in 
2011. Resultantly, the reversions on part of 
the tax administration to pre-reform mo-
res started to take place under the hammer 
of steep revenue targets, which not only 
went steeper by the year but also that their 
periodicity turned evermore frequent — 
from annual to quarterly, from quarterly 
to monthly, from monthly to weekly, and 
of late, from weekly to daily. Finance Min-
ister Ishaq Dar had repeatedly claimed to 
have fixed tough targets for the revenue 
administration so that it stretched itself a 
bit and was always on its toes. No doubt, 
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he appears to be completely oblivious of 
implications of fixing irrationally steep 
targets, which were completely divorced 
from the operating economic fundamen-
tals, potential, and realities. The top rev-
enue mandarins having no orientation 
of the economy in holistic terms then get 
unleashed on the taxpayer to hunt down 
the targets madly pursuing them on “beg, 
borrow, or steal” basis. It has been argued 
that in pursuance of brute revenue targets, 
the entire tax system has been withholdin-
gized, which is generating not only insuf-
ficient but also unhealthy revenues with 
serious fall outs for the system, economy 
and the society [20]. The tax administra-
tion, it is posited, has become a tail-eating 
snake in that the greater the amount of 
revenue it generates, the more harm it 
causes to the economy [20].
It is against the backdrop of this 
botched tax reform program that LTU-
Islamabad is being put to a comprehen-
sive micro-level institutionalist analysis 
with a view to drawing empirically-based 
insights to validate macro-level summa-
tions. The question that the paper looks to 
answer is if the absence of continued po-
litical will on part of the government and 
sustained monitoring on part of the donor 
causes failure, reversal, or even perver-
sion of a tax reform program? A subsid-
iary thematic thread that seams the study 
together is how come, absent both of the 
critical ingredients, a state as hungry for 
revenues as Pakistan, could afford to be so 
casually oblivious of its own fiscal impera-
tives — as evidenced by flagrant refusal to 
invest in the revenue administration. 
3. LTU-ization of the tax system
The TARP’s flag-ship initiative was 
the creation of three LTUs in Karachi, 
Lahore, and Islamabad12. This essentially 
meant establishment of highly special-
ized taxing organizations in metropolitan 
centers with earmarked catchment areas. 
The LTUs were designed to exercise ju-
risdiction over all cases having high rev-
enue-yielding potential located in their 
12 In 2016, another LTU, Karachi-II was 
established reinformcing confidence in the LTU-
ization of the tax administration.
respective catchment areas; be adequately 
staffed with well-trained and qualitatively 
superior human resource; and get alloca-
tion of funds good enough to convenient-
ly undertake revenue operations. At some 
level, the creation of LTUs also implied 
that the remainder of the field formations 
would operate primarily as a breeding 
ground for new cases, officers, and offi-
cials to be fed annually to these frontline 
revenue-spinning behemoths in a dynam-
ic manner, that is, simultaneously taking 
deadwood out of LTUs. The stated objec-
tives of the establishment of LTUs were 
to provide one-window facilitation to 
the taxpayers with revenue contribution 
above a definite threshold, extend better 
service to major taxpayers, improve tax 
collector-taxpayer relationship in qualita-
tive terms, ensure transparency, mitigate 
risks in the handling of major revenue-
yielding cases, reduce compliance costs 
by speeding up the dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and inject standardization in 
the implementation of tax laws across sec-
tors and regions. The pursued objectives of 
creation of LTUs, however, were to target 
revenues full-throttle where they actu-
ally lay through realignment of resources 
in a forceful and focused manner. 
The establishment of LTUs having 
been a key component of most World 
Bank, IMF and other multilateral and bi-
lateral donor-sponsored tax reform pro-
grams, was not unique to Pakistan. In 
Pakistan’s case, however, it proved to be a 
lot more than mere establishment of a few 
LTUs; it bordered on LTU-ization of the 
entire tax system in that not only that the 
LTUs were designed to harvest a bulk of 
the state revenues upto around 75 percent, 
but also that a major portion of the tax ma-
chinery was rolled back form the length 
and breadth of the country and concen-
trated into 15 major urban centers, and 
whatever little was left was assigned a ter-
tiary role of taxpayers’ facilitation, survey 
of new tax cases, monitoring of withhold-
ing taxes, and raising of deterrence against 
evasion through sparse audit and detec-
tion. Moreover, since geographic spread 
of the tax administration was massively 
curtailed greatly limiting its footprint and 
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capacity to leverage itself for proper rev-
enue generation mass withholdingization 
of the system compulsively took place 
[20]. The intensity of LTU-ization of the 
tax system can be gauged from the fact 
that within years of their establishment 
the total tax collection by the LTUs rose up 
to be above 65 percent of the total internal 
taxes as also plotted in Figure 1. 
What the data shows is that the LTUs’ 
contribution to total inland taxes conser-
vatively hovering around 43 percent in 
2008 touched the peak point of 65.4 per-
cent by 2012. In fact, the LTUs’ contribu-
tion touched the 60 percent mark in 2009 
and for the next four years stayed above 
it, before slipping down in 2014, and fall-
ing down to 55.5 percent in 2016; slightly 
recovering in 2017 to 58.5 percent. This is a 
vivid evidence of the fact that not only that 
reforms were not implemented with full 
thrust and integrity but also that they lost 
the momentum well before attaining the 
required trajectory intended and required. 
A dissection of LTUs’ performance in ab-
solute numbers vis-à-vis total inland rev-
enues collected as plotted in Figure gives 
more revealing insights.
It would be seen that LTUs’ revenue 
curve starts to pick up around 2008, when 
their contribution reached 279 billion out 
of the total inland tax collection of Rs. 647 
billion. The LTUs’ revenue curve attains 
the highest water mark in 2012 when its 
contribution at Rs. 802 billion constitutes 
65.4 percent of the total inland taxers to the 
tune of Rs. 1227 billion. Then on not only 
that LTUs’ revenue curve tends to flatten 
out but also that the gap between total in-
land taxes and LTUs’ contribution curves 
starts to widen incessantly. It is interesting 
to note that while the (exponential) trend-
line of the total inland taxes curve broadly 
follows the actual numbers, that of the 
LTUs’ contribution curve first lags behind 
between 2008 and 2013, and then 2014 on-
wards overtakes the actual number line. A 
simple arithmetic calculation results in a 
minimum loss of Rs. 148 billion if worked 
out on the mutual ratios attained in 2012. 
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This is the result of a botched, failed, and 
half-way abandoned tax reforms.
4. LTU-Islamabad
If measured purely in terms of reve-
nue numbers, establishment of LTUs fully 
justified itself as the revenue growth rate 
of the three LTUs remained greater than 
the national revenue growth rate until, of 
course, 2012; where-after it plummeted. In 
sharp contrast to LTU-Karachi, and LTU-
Lahore, it is generally argued that LTU-
Islamabad, has not performed even closer 
to its real potential. This insinuation is not 
all that misplaced when analyzed against 
the backdrop of LTU-Islamabad’s perfor-
mance over the past decade. The compara-
tive revenue growth trajectories of all four 
LTUs are plotted in Figure 3.
It would be seen that all three LTUs 
exhibit positive trends in revenue gen-
eration though at varying rates. It is in-
triguingly evident that LTU-Islamabad’s 
revenue curve rises in leaps between 2008 
and 2012, but then the line gets straight-
ened and stubbornly starts to move range-
bound around the figure of Rs. 350 bil-
lion. This certainly is an abnormality 
when compared with the revenue curves 
of LTU-Karachi and LTU-Lahore, which 
continue to rise unabated. The paradox 
gets further complicated when the three 
LTUs’ performance is compared on the 
basis of the simple efficiency-output crite-
rion i.e. total revenue generated per case 
per annum. On this rather a simple yard-
stick, LTU-Islamabad’s performance turns 
out the best as per the data presented in 
Figure 4.
It is evident that LTU-Islamabad’s per-
formance defined in terms of revenue gen-
erated per case at Rs. 901 million followed 
by that of LTU-Lahore at Rs. 380 million, 
LTU-Karachi at Rs. 325 million, and LTU-
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Karachi-II at Rs. 268 million far stands 
out and outperforms its closest competi-
tor LTU-Lahore, by a staggering revenue 
differential of Rs. 521 million per case. 
Thus, the paradox that — despite LTU-
Islamabad’s ability to extract far greater 
revenue per case in comparison with other 
LTUs, it is not being able to keep and sus-
tain an upward trajectory of its revenue 
curve — warrants serious and compre-
hensive analysis. It is premised that the 
straightening of LTU-Islamabad’s rev-
enue curve in Figure 3 — notwithstanding 
its higher per case yield as in Figure 4 — 
is due to abandoning of the foundational 
caveats of the reform program whereby 
the outfit was flagrantly denied adequate 
financing, feeding of fresh case portfolio, 
and staffing on an annual basis. 
The required testation of the hypoth-
esis is undertaken from the triple-per-
spective of jurisdictional, functional, and 
operational capacity as constrained by a 
lack of political ownership, manifesting in 
non-allocation of adequate number of tax 
cases, adequate funds, logistics, and suit-
able human resource. The paper also takes 
an intermittent cursory view of the nation-
al dynamics, which, directly or indirectly, 
affect LTU-Islamabad’s performance.
5. Jurisdictional capacity
Presently there are a total of 392 tax 
cases that have been assigned to LTU-Is-
lamabad, out of which 293 are corporate 
case, 50 are firms, and remaining 53 are 
individual taxpayers’ cases13. Recently, 
however, the jurisdiction of the directors 
of all corporations whose tax jurisdiction 
lies with LTU-Islamabad was also reposed 
therein, whereby an approximate tally of 
1500 individual cases of indeterminable 
value have also been added14. However, 
in practical terms the case records of only 
150 cases were got actually transmitted, 
leaving the status of the remaining 1300 
13 This was done vide FBR’s Order F. 
No. 5(26)Jurisdiction/2016/91894-R, dated July 
13, 2016.
14 The tax jurisdiction of directors’ indi-
vidual cases was transferred to LTU, Islam-
abad, vide FBR’s Notification No. 5(26)Jurisidic-
tion/2016/91894, dated July 13, 2016.
cases of varying revenue potential uncer-
tain. It will not be out of place to mention 
that as per the original scheme of reforms, 
LTUs were to have jurisdiction over large 
revenue-yielding corporate cases only. 
It is premised that LTU-Islamabad’s rev-
enue curve in Figure 3 has flattened ma-
jorly because the case portfolio that was 
required to be assigned to it dynamically 
on an annual basis was not assigned. This 
plausibly could have happened on four 
counts.
5.1. Non-operationalization  
of “catchment area” concept
The underlying purpose of establish-
ing LTUs at geographically dispersed lo-
cations was to earmark their catchment ar-
eas with the understanding that all major 
cases above a prescribed threshold in that 
entire region would fall in some LTU — 
Karachi, Lahore or Islamabad. Thus, 
while LTU-Karachi’s catchment area was 
supposedly entire provinces of Sindh, and 
Baluchistan, and LTU-Lahore’s entire cen-
tral and south Punjab, LTU-Islamabad’s 
catchment area was restrictively defined 
in terms of Islamabad Capital Territory, 
and Rawalpindi Division — although, 
initially Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was also 
taken to have been earmarked as LTU-
Islamabad’s catchment area. This meant 
that all “large” cases located in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa fell out of the nexus of any 
LTU, and were consequently peacefully 
perched in Regional Tax Office, Peshawar 
and Regional Tax Office, Abbottabad15. 
This happened in complete derogation to 
the very concept, raison d’être, and the 
purpose of LTU-ization. Going by the tax 
declarations filed for T/Y 2017, there were 
a total of 80 cases in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
with a turnover in excess of Rs. 1,000 mil-
lion — the qualifying condition for a case 
to be assigned to an LTU. Accordingly, all 
those 80 cases legitimately belonging to 
LTU-Islamabad are currently lying in Re-
gional Tax Office, Peshawar and Regional 
Tax Office, Abbottabad. In tax terms, the 
jurisdictional locale of a case can have 
15 Jurisdictionally, the entire KP is divided 
between RTO, Peshawar and RTO, Abbottabad.
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concrete consequences — both for the tax-
payer as well as for the exchequer, which 
means that given LTU-Islamabad’s ability 
to generate relatively greater revenues, 
these cases would have been put to a 
harder audit squeeze resulting in substan-
tial additional contribution.
5.2. Erosion of LTU-Islamabad’s tax 
jurisdiction 
Since re-energization of LTU-Islam-
abad’s jurisdiction did not take place at 
regular intervals, the bulk of its cases 
have lost their vibrancy, vitality, and 
revenue potential. Resultantly, LTU-Is-
lamabad, is currently left with only 138 
cases above Rs. 1,000 million threshold. 
It will not be out of place to mention that 
out of these 392 cases 119 did not even 
file their tax returns for T/Y 2017. An-
other factor that may have contributed to 
the erosion of LTU-Islamabad’s jurisdic-
tion is that due to intense oversight of the 
cases, most of the major taxpayers have 
established their subsidiaries in close-by 
Regional Tax Offices to divert revenues 
and get assessed. This particular issue, 
though recent in nature, yet highly detri-
mental to the cause of revenue collection, 
has yet to be systematically analyzed and 
arrested through proper administrative 
and legal interventions.
5.3. LTU-Islamabad’s cases in regional tax 
offices, Rawalpindi & Islamabad
A substantial number of cases that 
otherwise qualify on the basis of Rs. 1,000 
million to be in LTU-Islamabad, are con-
veniently operating well below the de-
partmental radar in Regional Tax Office, 
Rawalpindi and Regional Tax Office, Is-
lamabad. The number of such cases on 
the basis of T/Y 2017 is 24 and 51, respec-
tively. The abandoning of the cardinal 
principles of reforms led to steep fixation 
of revenue targets for Regional Tax Offices 
as well that bred a perverse tendency in 
the management of the Regional Tax Of-
fices to protect those cases under their ju-
risdiction, and since the arrangement also 
suits those taxpayers, it is quite easier for 
those cases to stay out of LTU-Islamabad.
5.4. Jurisdictional manipulation 
Then there are tax cases which, purely 
on the basis of their potential to contrib-
ute to the national exchequer, should be 
in LTU-Islamabad. However, due to deft 
manipulation, they manage their decla-
rations so as to keep themselves out of 
LTU-Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and resul-
tantly an enhanced focus, oversight, and 
audit squeeze. In fact, such cases require 
greater administrative focus, tracking and 
adequate response. 
Thus, going by the set threshold of 
turnover of Rs. 1 billion, there are cur-
rently more cases at 144 that lie outside 
LTU-Islamabad than inside at 138, and 
this is happening right in the face of LTU-
Islamabad’s unparalleled performance on 
per case basis and an equally flat revenue 
curve. Likewise, the eroding jurisdictional 
capacity of LTU-Islamabad on account of 
fragmentation of corporations and ma-
nipulation of account can be construed 
to have a lowering impact on its revenue 
curve as plotted in Figure 3, could be sub-
stantial. 
6. Functional capacity
One of the key thematic pillars of tax 
reform initiatives under TARP, and by im-
plication of the LTUization was the recon-
figuration of tax field formations i.e. LTUs 
and Regional Tax Offices on functional 
lines under which specialized stand-alone 
Commissionerates for audit, enforcement, 
prosecution, information processing, tax-
payers’ facilitation, and human resource 
management were to be established. The 
functional system remained in place until 
around 2013, and then at different occa-
sions it was rigged and reversed sans any 
legwork and due diligence, and the archa-
ic pre-reform configuration was reintro-
duced whereunder everybody would do 
everything. The support Commissioner-
ates went redundant as the roles assigned 
to them were essentially monopolized by 
Chief Commissioner’s office having been 
vested with little or no legal powers under 
the taxing statutes. These heretic devia-
tions from the tax reforms cardinal prin-
ciples had their implications for both the 
revenue and the revenue system. With 
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these perversions in the backdrop, LTU-
Islamabad’s functional capacity can be 
analyzed from the perspective of its two 
critical constituents — the Commissioner-
ates and the Functional Units.
6.1. Commissionerates
Functionally, LTU-Islamabad is con-
figured into four revenue Commissioner-
ates, with each Commissionerate consist-
ing of two Additional Commissionerates 
and six Functional Units headed by Dep-
uty Commissioner, Inland Revenue Ser-
vice. Figure 5 depicts the deployment of 
Deputy Commissioners in each Commis-
sionerate as of December 31, 2017.
It can be noted that LTU-Islamabad 
is currently operating at only 50% of its 
prescribed strength as far as the critically 
important tier of Deputy Commissioner 
is concerned. Resultantly, out of 24 Func-
tional Units, 12 are being manned on ad-
hoc basis by assigning additional charge 
to other incumbents. Deputy Commis-
sioners being over-worked are unable to 
make qualitative difference at the time 
of making assessment of tax liability in 
large cases. They feel alienated from the 
organizational goals — a key input in the 
context of any target-oriented enforce-
ment outfit.
6.2. Functional units 
Likewise, the capacity of Functional 
Units is further sapped and becomes ques-
tionable when viewed from the perspec-
tive of deployment of proper workforce 
in there. The workforce deputed in each 
Functional Unit of each Commissionerate 
is plotted in Figure 6. 
The revenue administration may not 
have yet prescribed the standard (and 
adequate) size of a Functional Unit hav-
ing a critical mass and functionability16, 
yet the deployment of both professional 
and support staff in each Functional Unit 
is alarmingly scanty. The non-availability 
16 This, in itself, may be an evidence of the 
fact that the tax reforms remained truncated 
and the work on apparently insignificant but 
critically important issues was not carried out or 
completed.
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of qualitatively superior and motivated 
workforce appears to have operated as 
a key pull-back factor on LTU-Islam-
abad’s revenue effort over the past de-
cade. LTU-Islamabad’s four revenue 
Commissionerates, which currently are 
operating at exactly 50 percent of their 
sanctioned strength, cannot reasonably 
be expected to achieve the assigned tar-
gets in a healthy and wholesome manner 
and give required growth in revenues, 
and if they continue to do so under du-
ress, LTU-Islamabad’s revenue curve in 
Figure 3 might soon even start to nose-
dive from the current descending trend. 
The Functional Units — the very lynch-
pin of the taxation system — are oper-
ating with scant or no professional sup-
port with some of them being headed by 
Deputy Commissioner as one-man army, 
and would, therefore, be unfair to expect 
of them any quantum jump in revenue, 
which LTU-Islamabad desperately needs 
to resurrect its declining revenue curve. 
7. Operational capacity
LTU-Islamabad’s operational capacity 
can be analyzed in terms of cost of collec-
tion (CoC), workforce insufficiency, and 
logistical deficiencies defined in terms of 
transportation, system hard and software, 
and office space availability. 
7.1. Cost of collection
One of the key ingredients of any orga-
nization’s performance is as to how much 
it has in overhead cost allocations. LTU-Is-
lamabad’s CoC in absolute terms alongside 
total revenue collected over the past one 
decade or so is plotted in Figure 7.
It is intriguing to note that during 
LTU-ization’s first phase i.e. 2008–2012, 
the revenue curve and the CoC curve rise 
in tandem, but then around 2012–13, CoC 
curve starts to lag behind though both 
lines maintain their respective trajecto-
ries. In overall terms the gap between 
the curves continues to widen slowly but 
steadily. It appears that the stress on the 
CoC curve starts to impact the revenue 
curve around 2017, when both lines begin 
to take a downward trend. The standard 
yardstick of CoC as percentage of total 
revenue collected when inducted into 
the analysis can sharpen our understand-
ing of the issue. LTU-Islamabad’s CoC as 
percentage of revenue collection is plot-
ted in Figure 8.
Against the world average of around 
1.5 percent in CoC, and Pakistan’s overall 
CoC of 0.7 percent, LTU-Islamabad’s CoC 
is currently embarrassingly below 0.1 per-
cent meaning thereby that it does not even 
have a Paisa17 to spend to collect Rs. 100 
in revenue. During the first half of LTU-
Islamabad’s life, CoC was above 1 Paisa 
but then it drops below 1 Paisa. The op-
pressive implication of lower CoC gets 
17 Pakistan rupee is divisible into 100 paisas; 
over time, the devalaution of currency due to 
inflation, the Central Bank (State Bank of Pakistan) 
has stopped producing coins denominated in 
paisa, but rupee continues to be consisting of 100 
paisas notionally.
82
131 145 154
201 225
242 275
322 299
83
231
260
298
364 320
359 371
385
353
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
CoC, Rs. in million LTU, Islamabad, Rs. in billion
Figure 7. Revenue collection & CoC comparative trajectories
Source: LTU-Islamabad
Journal of Tax Reform. 2018. T. 4, № 3. С. 202–222
216
ISSN 2412-8872
more pronounced in cases where wages 
(and other fixed costs) constitute a big-
ger portion of the total CoC. Figure 9 bi-
furcates LTU-Islamabad’s CoC between 
wages and residual resources available 
to the management to undertake revenue 
operations.
It is observed that currently the por-
tion of CoC going into salaries and wages 
is as high as 80 percent. Higher salaries 
add to the welfare of the workforce but 
conversely it means availability of less 
resources for actual revenue operations. 
The ratio of residual CoC to wages was 
34 percent in 2009, which went down to 
19 percent in 2013, rose to 28 percent in 
2016, but again has dropped to 20 percent, 
with both lines taking divergent trends. 
The drop in wage bill is attributable to 
increasingly scantier workforce deployed 
at the LTU-Islamabad, and not due to any 
excess allocations in operational costs. In 
reality, things come to such a pass that no 
funds are reported to fuel the transporta-
tion fleet and process other routine mat-
ters. At one stage, the officers even had to 
contribute from their own pocket to file 
urgent suits in the Supreme Court to pro-
tect revenue from going down the drain 
since no funds in the relevant account 
head were available. 
7.2. Workforce gap
LTU-Islamabad, much like LTU-
Karachi and LTU-Lahore, was supposed 
to be a flagship Inland Revenue Service 
filed formation with quality human re-
source in sufficient quantity to process 
top revenue-yielding cases. At least, in 
quantitative terms, this premise held its 
ground at the onset when the workforce 
deployed slightly exceeded the work-
force assigned. However, soon thereaf-
ter the deployment of human resource 
started to lag behind even the sanctioned 
workforce as plotted in Figure 10.
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The data reveals that not only that 
workforce deployment has been less 
than the required levels but also that the 
former has come down from its highest 
mark of 381 in 2009 to 242 in 2017. In 
this respect, a concomitant serious issue 
confronting LTU-Islamabad is that of 
workforce ageing, which currently turns 
out about 50 on the average. The ageing 
factor attains further significance in view 
that it is even higher in professional cad-
res — Inspectors and Auditors. The cad-
re-wise ageing pattern at the workforce 
level is plotted in Figure 11.
The data presented in Figure 11 
vividly reveals that average age in the 
professional cadres like Inspectors and 
Auditors etc. is 47 and 50, respectively. 
It goes without saying that ageing ad-
versely impacts output and performance 
of the employees, and by implication, of 
the organization. The cumulative effect 
of the foregoing factors renders LTU-Is-
lamabad, stressful and unpleasant place 
where few are willing to work, and give 
their best. This, of course, could not have 
been one of the desired outcomes of the 
reforms, in general, and LTUization, in 
particular.
7.3. Logistical deficiencies 
Logistical deficiencies confronting 
LTU-Islamabad, are being analyzed in 
terms of transportation facilities, the qual-
ity of computing hard- and software, and 
office-space available to carry out revenue 
operations. 
7.3.1. Transportation 
The total existing CC capacity of LTU-
Islamabad’s transportation fleet consist-
ing of 30 vehicles comes to CC 31,000 as 
of December 31, 2017, which is extremely 
meagre vis-à-vis its revenue contribution. 
The transportation fleet by year of make/
model is plotted in Figure 12.
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Out of the total fleet of 30 vehicles 
only 7 are of recent make and, therefore, 
less operational cost-intensive. Going by 
the government’s own rules which al-
lows depreciation @ rate of 20 percent, 
the remainder of the entire fleet of LTU-
Islamabad, has already been depreci-
ated; hence outdated. Its compulsive re-
tention by the management eats into the 
financial allocations on account of fuel 
and operational maintenance at a rapid 
pace, which then do not get replenished 
resulting in stress on revenue opera-
tions.
7.3.2. Computing hard & software
Contrary to Government of Pakistan 
rules stipulating that no pirated software 
could be used at any of its properties, 
LTU-Islamabad is compelled to use soft-
ware which does not necessarily conform 
to the standard of propriety and lawful-
ness in its fullest sense. The situation is 
equally grim when it comes to hardware 
facilities. Both hard and soft-wares being 
used by LTU-Islamabad are risk-prone, 
hazardous and relatively deficient in 
reliability and robustness. Quite often 
the systems get stalled, crashed, broken 
down brining revenue operations to a 
grinding halt.
7.3.3. Workspace availability
LTU-Islamabad is one of those sparse-
ly lucky public sector organizations that 
are housed in their own premises. A Plan-
ning Commission 1 (PC1)18 was prepared 
in 2004 for a total projected cost of Rs. 
29.450 million to be spent over the next 
two years. Originally, it meant to be the 
office building for the Regional Commis-
sioner, Income Tax/Wealth Tax (Northern 
Region), Islamabad. It was noted that the 
“building is of paramount importance to 
achieve the objectives of projecting the im-
age of the organization”, and, therefore, 
an effort was “made to produce a struc-
ture where the real amenities and aesthet-
ics of the building are shared and enjoyed 
by the users and visitors alike”19. The eco-
nomic life the building was estimated to 
be 60 years at a recurring cost of Rs. 0.790 
million per annum. The project was ap-
proved in the Departmental Development 
Working Party meeting held on April 28, 
2004, by observing that “this building 
meant for Regional Commissioner In-
come Tax’s office would also be utilized 
for “Large Taxpayers’ Unit” to provide 
quality services to the taxpayers at single 
access point under the tax administration 
reform project”20. The project having gone 
into time overrun for a couple of years 
was completed in 2008. Interestingly, only 
a gray structure was completed and then 
handed over leaving the entire premises 
to be partitioned on open-floor basis. At 
the long last, LTU-Islamabad moved to its 
present premises in late 2008.
At the outset, gross office space avail-
able was 105 square yards per employee; it 
came down to 98, and then 87 square yards 
in 2009, and 2010, respectively. Neverthe-
less, still in the spirit of the reforms and 
LTU-ization, all amenities like cafeteria, 
potable water, mosque and parking lot 
were conveniently made available. Sud-
denly, however, in 2011, the space avail-
able per employee nosedives down to 29 
square yards as also depicted in Figure 13.
18 “PC1” stands for Planning Commission 
1 and means the basic blueprint of a project to 
be funded under Public Sector Development 
Programme (PSDP).
19 PC1 of the project titled «Construction of Of-
fice Building for Regional Commissioner Income 
Tax/Wealth Tax (Northern Region), Islamabad». 
20 Minutes of the Departmental Develop-
ment Working Party Meeting held on April 28, 
2008, in CBR (HQs), Islamabad.
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In fact, FBR had written in 2009, 
enquiring of LTU-Islamabad, “to inti-
mate whether Regional Tax Office, Is-
lamabad, can be adjusted in the newly 
constructed Income Tax House”21. LTU-
Islamabad, promptly responded by stat-
ing that “for the proper functioning, 
LTU-Islamabad, requires all of the 2nd, 
3rd, and 4th floors in the LTU Complex 
to accommodate its sanctioned strength, 
record (Income Tax & Sales Tax), mis-
cellaneous storage, staff cafeteria etc.” 
and therefore, “it may not be possible 
to accommodate/adjust Regional Tax 
Office, Islamabad, in LTU, Complex”22. 
However, in late 2010, FBR bulldozed 
Regional Tax Office, Islamabad’s place-
ment in the LTU-Islamabad’s premises, 
sending the entire reform-compatible 
inner lay-out in a total disarray. The 
office space available also hit the rock-
bottom at 29 square yards in 2010, but 
then slightly improved to 34 square 
yards per person in 2017, which, in fact, 
is not due to any increase in the office-
space available but due to reduction in 
the manpower available on account of 
transfer and superannuation. 
At some level, workforce attrition 
may have been induced by workplace 
reduction. Quite contrary to the original 
designs, LTU-Islamabad, on a closer look, 
paints a run-down, untidy and stuffy 
place with water-leaking in facility areas, 
choking power systems, and insufficient 
21 FBR’s Memorandum No. 7(1)CBR/Es-
tate/07, dated July 14, 2009.
22 LTU-Islamabad’s Memorandum No. DG/
LTU/2009/321, dated August 5, 2009.
cramped service areas. People eat at their 
desk or in clusters, and offer prayers at 
the retrofitted mosque established in the 
parking area externalizing vehicles and 
bikes parking. The basement level which 
was originally supposed to be a park-
ing lot, now caters to more than half of 
LTU-Islamabad’s workforce, and since it 
lacked built-in design features for such 
usage, it is eternally stuffy, less airy, dark 
and unpleasant creating health hazards 
for large number of employees housed 
there. It may, therefore, not be astonish-
ing that LTU-Islamabad’s medical bill 
has exponentially gone up over the past 
half-decade, unfinanced at any given 
point in time. In the process, the biomet-
ric system installed at the entrance has 
also been rendered redundant as people 
are moving in and out at multiple times 
during the day for multiple legitimate 
purposes. 
Thus, the stress on LTU-Islamabad’s 
revenue curve in Figure 3 can be ex-
plained in terms of the stress on its CoC 
curve as plotted in Figure 7 and Fi- 
gure 8. Workforce deficiency consistent-
ly running one-fourth of the prescribed 
strength, in combine with other related 
variables like workforce training and 
motivation — coercively imping on LTU-
Islamabad’s revenue operations as a sub-
stantive constraining factor. Logistical 
deficiencies of grave nature as gleaned 
not only undermine the very rationale 
of LTU-ization of the tax administration, 
but also adversely affect the taxpayer 
perception — a key element for any tax 
administration.
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Conclusion
It can thus be summarized that LTU-
Islamabad’s consistently static perfor-
mance for the past five years stubbornly 
staying below Rs. 400 billion mark is ex-
plainable in terms of its triple-deficiency 
of jurisdictional, functional, and opera-
tional capacity constraints. These con-
straints directly stem from the polity’s 
jettisoning of the tax reforms well be-
fore the finish-line. Astonishingly, LTU-
Islamabad’s uncanny ability to generate 
far more revenue per case as compared to 
other LTUs has either never been propa-
gated or heard by the decision-making 
structures. The “catchment area” concept 
being the cornerstone of the LTU-ization 
process has paid off through relatively 
high-trajectory revenue-generation over 
the past one decade or so elsewhere but 
the same conveniently got hushed up 
with reference to LTU-Islamabad; it cer-
tainly had a definite price-tag in terms of 
revenues foregone. It has also convinc-
ingly been brought out that LTU-Islam-
abad’s jurisdiction stands undermined 
to such a level that currently it may not 
only be insufficient to lift up the revenue 
curve but also that it may not even be 
able to maintain its current trajectory — 
until, of course, tax revenues pertaining 
to future periods are pulled up as is the 
vogue presently. The continued non-as-
signment of LTU-worthy cases to LTU-
Islamabad may have its consequences not 
only because of the potential additional 
revenues being squandered on this count 
but also because its existing portfolio 
may be losing its vitality through attri-
tion. It is not astonishing that in the wake 
of non-rule-based assignment of cases 
to LTU-Islamabad, some of the existing 
taxpayers may have wriggled out of it to 
softer taxing organizations e.g. any of the 
Regional Tax Offices.
One of the most critical blow that 
the TARP-pushed tax reform program 
received before some of its key interven-
tions adequately gelatinized was the pol-
ity’s complete shift of focus from reform 
to revenue towards the onset of Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz government in 
2013. Finance Minister Dar systematically 
applied a reset button on the tax reforms 
by appointing a brand new tax reform 
commission summarily abandoning the 
still ongoing reforms. Fixation of monthly 
targets and their frantic chasing on “beg, 
borrow, steal” basis crept in partly due to 
mounting fiscal stress, partly due to the 
merger of income tax and sales tax depart-
ments, and partly due to wanton ways of 
dealing with the state’s revenue function. 
This way the traditional culture of making 
proper assessments, and defending them 
at appellate fora became almost extinct 
over the past one half decade. Monthly 
target fixation led to monthly account-
ability of failures — which took the entire 
workforce into a frenzied mode of taxa-
tion whereby holding back of refunds and 
pulling forward of tax on future earnings 
has become the new normal — changing 
the very DNA of the tax machinery and 
reversing the role of FBR from that of 
revenue-generator to part debt-creator a 
la Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs 
Division, National Savings Organization, 
and even the State Bank of Pakistan. It was 
remarked that now the only difference 
between money printed by State Bank of 
Pakistan and taxes collected by FBR was 
that the latter was cheaper, as during F/Y 
2016 State Bank of Pakistan had spent Rs. 
9.1 billion on printing money [21], while 
FBR had spent far less. Alm and Khan sur-
vey Pakistan’s tax policy effects on busi-
ness incentives, evaluate its corporate tax-
ation, compare it with worldwide trends 
in the taxation of corporates, and suggest 
ways and means to reforming the system 
of business taxation in Pakistan [22].
The analysis carried out in the paper 
divulges a few key take-homes, which 
carry robust potential of generalizability 
to other similarly-circumstanced develop-
ing countries, their tax systems, and the 
World Bank and IMF-driven tax reform 
programs. Firstly, the tax reforms have no 
chance of making to success levels if po-
litical ownership dissipates mid-stream as 
happened with the process of LTU-ization 
in Pakistan. At some level, mere political 
ownership may not be enough, but an 
overarching consensus across the politi-
cal divide may be required to ensure con-
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tinued political sanction of the reforms to 
hedge against the hazards of government 
changes. Secondly, donor-driven reforms 
do require continued donor-ownership, 
oversight and monitoring particularly if it 
involves behemoths like IMF and World 
Bank. The inclusion of TARP-type tax re-
forms as an agenda item in International 
Monetary Fund’s Article IV consultations 
even after the closure of project on part of 
the World Bank, could have made a dif-
ference. This is because political elites of 
the developing countries, as soon as they 
get a chance, choose to have a go at the 
tax system. It has been argued that mo-
nopolization of the tax system is of ut-
most importance if the ruling elites have 
to protect their riches and further enhance 
the extant status quo [23]. Lastly, it is evi-
dently in developing countries’ interest 
to allocate adequate resources to their tax 
systems enabling them to constantly up-
grade themselves as well as undertake 
their routine operations without any fi-
nancial constraints simply because even-
tually it is their own tax systems that can 
generate the most cost-effective revenues 
needed to maintain the routine state func-
tions as well as implement programs for 
the much-needed economic development. 
Alternatively, if adequate investments are 
not made in the tax machinery as in LTU-
Islamabad’s case, in particular, and post-
TARP national tax reforms, in general, 
developing countries would have to com-
pulsively opt for debt-creating resource-
generation with all its multifaceted inimi-
cal implications.
References
1. Qazi R. S. Tax Administration Reform Project. NMC Individual Research Paper, 1-10, 2008. 
Available at: http://www.fbr.gov.pk.
2. Haq I., Bukhari H. Tax Reforms. Business Recorder, 2012, March 30.
3. Ahmed M. A. Elites, Extraction, and State Autonomy: Pakistan and U.S in Comparison. Doct. 
Diss. Quaid-e-Azam University, 2015. Pp. 252–417.
4. Akhter S. Tax Reform Programme Failed to Deliver, Government Admits. The News, 
2012, July 26.
5. Martinez-Vazquez J. M. Richter K. Pakistan’s Short and Medium Term Reform Options. 
In: Martinez-Vazquez J. M., Cyan M. R. (eds) The Role of Taxation in Pakistan’s Revival. Karachi, 
Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 549–684.
6. Grossman M. G., Helpman, E. Protection for Sale. American Economic Review, 1994, 
vol. 84, pp. 833–850.
7. Bird M. R. Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reforms in Developing Countries. In: 
Gillis M. (ed.) Tax Reforms in Developing Countries. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989. 
Pp. 315–346.
8. Gordon R. H., Li W. Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible 
Explanation. Journal of Public Economics, 2009, vol. 93, no. 7-8, pp. 855–866. DOI: 10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2009.04.001.
9. Ahmad E., Stern N. H. The Theory and Practice of Tax Reform in Developing Countries. New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 344 p.
10. Stotsky J. Summary of Tax Policy Advice. In: Shome P. (ed.) Tax Policy Handbook. 
Washington DC, IMF, 1995. Pp. 279–283.
11. Klein N. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York, Metropolitan 
Books, 2007. 726 p.
12. Burgess R., Stern N. Taxation and Development. London, LSE, 1992.
13. Orsmond D. W. H., Mackenzie G. A., Gerson P. The Composition of Fiscal Adjustment and 
Growth: Lessons from Fiscal Reforms in Eight Economies. Washington DC, IMF, 1997. 72 p.
14. Ather R., Rider M. Pakistan’s Tax Gap: Estimates by Tax Collection and Methodology. 
Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2008.
15. Pasha H. A. Political Economy of Tax Reforms: The Pakistan Experience. Pakistan Journal 
of Applied Economics, 1995, vol. 11, no. 1-2, pp. 129–154. Available at: http://aerc.edu.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/8th-Paper-Page-129-154c-1.pdf
16. Islam A. Issues in Tax Reforms. Asia Pacific Development Journal. 2001, vol. 8, no. 1. 
Available at: https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/apdj-8-1-1-ISLAM.pdf
17. Thirsk W. A Review of Major Taxes. In: Vazquez J. M., Cyan M. R. (ed.) The Role of 
Taxation in Pakistan’s Revival, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 78–117.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2018. T. 4, № 3. С. 202–222
222
ISSN 2412-8872
18. Wahid U., Wallace S. The Equity Debate in Tax Policy. In: Martinez-Vazquez J. M., 
Cyan M. R. (eds) The Role of Taxation in Pakistan’s Revival. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 
2015. Pp. 255–336.
19. Michielse G. M. Tax Provisions and the Global Economy. Martinez-Vazquez J. M., 
Cyan M. R. (eds) The Role of Taxation in Pakistan’s Revival. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 
2015. Pp. 209–254.
20. Ahmed M. A. Pakistan: Withholdingization of the Economic System. A Source of 
Revenue, Civil Strife or Dutch Disease+? Pakistan Development Review, 2018, vol. 57, no. 4, 
pp. 1–43.
21. Yasir, M. S.B.P Had to Spend Rs. 9.1 Billion on Printing Currency Notes Last Year, 
2017. Available at: https://propakistani.pk/2017/11/01/sbp-spend-rs-9-1-billion-printing-
currency-notes-last-year/
22. Alm J., Khan M. A. Tax Policy Effects on Business Incentives. In: Martinez-
Vazquez J. M., Cyan M. R. (eds) The Role of Taxation in Pakistan’s Revival. Karachi, Oxford 
University Press, 2015. Pp. 142–248.
23. Ahmed M. A. Pakistan: Extraction, Elites and State Autonomy: A Theoretical 
Configuration. The Pakistan Development Review, 2017, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 127–162.
Author
Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed — Dr., Chief (International Taxes), Federal Board of Reve-
nue, Government of Pakistan (Constitution Avenue, Islamabad-44000, Pakistan);  
ORCID: 0000-0002-7281-9133; e-mail: Muhammad.ashfaq@fbr.gov.pk.
Информация об авторе
Мухаммад Ашфак Ахмед — доктор наук, руководитель отдела международных 
налогов, Федеральный совет по доходам Правительства Пакистана (Пакистан, 
Исламабад-44000, Авеню Конституции); ORCID: 0000-0002-7281-9133; e-mail: 
Muhammad.ashfaq@fbr.gov.pk.
For citation 
Ahmed M. A. Pakistan: wither tax reforms — the case of large taxpayers’ unit, 
Islamabad. Journal of Tax Reform, 2018, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 202–222. DOI: 10.15826/
jtr.2018.4.3.052
Для цитирования 
Ахмед М. А. Провал налоговых реформ в Пакистане: анализ деятельности под-
разделения по работе с крупными налогоплательщиками Исламабада / Мухам-
мад Ашфак Ахмед // Journal of Tax Reform. — 2018. — Т. 4, № 3. — С. 202–222. — 
DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2018.4.3.052
Article info 
Received August 30, 2018; accepted December 9, 2018 
Информация о статье 
Дата поступления 30 августа 2018 г.; дата принятия к печати 9 декабря 2018 г.
